Abstract: Copyright Collecting Societies have proliferated, with more than 150 organisations now collecting and distributing licensing fees for rights in music,
Introduction
Copyright collecting societies are complex institutions. Outsiders, and even insiders, have found it difficult to understand the rights they manage as well as their tariff and distribution structures. The principles governing the relationship between licensors and licensees are poorly articulated. Yet, by providing access to information goods and rewarding creators and investors of copyright-protected materials, collecting societies are integral to the structure of an information society.
Copyright societies have been likened to joint ventures, trustees, mutual societies and collecting agents. In some countries, they are constituted as corporate non-profit organisations (UK), in others they may operate under a government monopoly grant (Austria, Italy, Japan). Most European societies are somewhat in the middle, constituted as private membership associations but subject to close regulatory supervision. This may include formal permissions to operate a collecting society, statutory obligations regarding membership rules, accounting procedures and licensing conditions, or tariffs set directly by government (e.g. levies on blank tapes, recordable discs and copying equipment). 1 In the UK, there are currently 13 collective licensing bodies, some managing very valuable primary rights, such as the music rights to public performance and broadcasting assigned to the Performing Right Society PRS, or the right to make and distribute recordings for which the Mechanical-Copyright Protection Society MCPS acts as exclusive agent. The largest societies exercise considerable economic clout. In . By my own estimate, there are currently more than 150 collecting societies acting for right holders in the EU alone (about 65 core music licensing societies, about 40 core reprographic societies licensing printed materials and numerous miscellaneous collective managers). Europe's largest society is Germany's GEMA (administering music performing and mechanical rights) with an annual turnover exceeding €800m (annual report 2003).
In this article, I argue that the policy attraction of collective licensing in a digital environment consists in two features:
From a user perspective, collecting societies may offer a single point licence providing easy and wide access. This can be a solution to innovation issues in the information society where major right holders otherwise may dictate problematic terms.
Creators at the margins of commercial viability have access to a mechanism of collective bargaining against major rights exploiters, such as publishers, record labels and broadcasters. This may be an important support mechanism in fostering a culturally diverse society. 
Characteristics of Collecting Societies
The origins of collective administration may appear as a straightforward response to a problem of transaction costs. An evocative story recounts the visit of Ernest Bourget, In the case of music performing right and mechanical reproduction societies, the most intriguing feature of collective administration is the representation of both authors (composers and lyricists) and publishers -enforced by a governance structure under which changes to membership and distribution rules can only be implemented by mutual consent of both groups. Despite market pressures to the contrary, author members of German society GEMA receive 70% (compared to 30% of the publisher) of any performing right royalty distribution, and 60% of the mechanical rights. PRS distributes 50:50 between publishers and creators, while MCPS leaves the distribution shares to individual contracts between the parties. 13 In addition, large right holders whose works are easier to monitor and account for, in effect subsidise small members. These distribution decisions are treated as internal matters, and will not be publicised.
Many European collecting societies also weigh their distribution per copyright work 14 At GEMA, so-called 'evaluation committees' weighs the distribution of royalties to authors from considerations of length of membership, past income, artistic personality and overall contribution of an oeuvre. In the UK, the classical music subsidy in the royalty distribution formula was phased out following the MMC report of 1996 (Monopolies and Mergers Commission Performing Rights, London: HMSO Cm 3147). In 1999, a PRS foundation was established for the support of new music, regardless of genre. 15 The German law regulating copyright societies (Urheberwahrnehmungsgesetz) explicitly demands that they should foster 'culturally important works and contributions' ( §7) and set up pension and social funds ( §8). Anglo-American right holders are enraged by these deductions. The analysis suggests that collective administration can also be viewed as a form of unionisation. Authors no longer enter the market as individuals. 16 This enables them to extract better terms than contracting individually with music publishers and music users (such as labels and broadcasters), and provide socio-cultural support to creators.
In summary, the features of European Collecting Societies are:
Characteristics under transaction cost rationale that cannot be transferred as property: chiefly the right to paternity (the right to be named as the author) and the right to integrity (the right to object to modifications of a work that would prejudice the author's reputation). 22 The ECJ has consistently refused to distinguish literary and artistic property in this way, asserting that 'the exclusive rights conferred by literary and artistic property are by their nature such as to affect trade in goods and services and also competitive relationships within the The Commission advocates the Simulcasting model of competition between collecting societies. This will be further discussed below.
Abuse of a dominant position (Art. 82 issues)
There is widespread consensus that collecting societies occupy a dominant position in their national markets. In many cases, single national markets have been ruled to be a 'substantial part' of the common market within the meaning of Article 82. 35 The Article 82 case law on collecting societies falls into two groups: abusive conduct towards members, and abusive conduct towards users. These will be summarised in turn. -There can be no preferential treatment for groups of members, but threshold conditions to full membership, and distribution variations according to genre and cultural value have been tolerated. 37 -There must be maximum freedom for members to decide which repertoire to inject into collective administration. However, collecting societies can insist on transfer of whole groups of rights, and rights in future works if that is indispensable to the operation of the society. 38 -Right holders must be able to withdraw from membership, and assign their repertoire elsewhere. Collecting societies can insist on lengthy notice periods. 39 -Collecting societies can limit the influence of members who are economically dependent on users (i.e. if a publisher is part of the same parent company as a record label). However the least restrictive measure has to be adopted. 40 -There is no specific ECJ case law on the freedom (or otherwise) of collecting societies to refuse the administration of individual rights and right-holders. 41 -There is no ECJ case law on the legitimacy of socio-cultural deductions.
Members

Users
-As a dominant undertaking, a collecting society cannot refuse to license a user in its own territory without a legitimate reason. 42
37 GEMA II (decision of 6 July 1972, OJ L166/22). However, there is a recent policy trend requiring that royalty distribution must match actual use as closely as possible (MMC report on PRS, 1996; COM 261). There is no case law to that effect. 38 A required blanket assignment of all present and future rights was ruled to be abusive in BRT v. SABAM. In GEMA I, the Commission identified seven categories of rights members may assign separately: (1) public performance, (2) broadcasting, (3) film performance, (4) mechanical reproduction, (5) film synchronisation, (6) video reproduction and performance, (7 39 In GEMA II, the commission allowed a minimum membership term of three years. Retaining right for five years after a member's withdrew is likely to be unfair (BRT v. SABAM). 40 For example, conditions on the exercise of votes are acceptable, exclusions from membership are not (GEMA I). Restrictions can be imposed that strengthen a society's negotiation power toward users (SABAM, para. 9). In GEMA III (OJ L94 /12, decision of 4 December 1981), the Commission authorised the societies statutes imposing uniform effective rates of renumeration (thus preventing members from making payments to users). 41 The general Article 82 case law on refusal to supply applies (e.g. 47 The French Discothèques cases (Lucazeau, Tournier) hint at problems with SACEM's administrative overheads due to lack of competition, but left the issue to national regulation. .4m are attributable to downloads and €3.8m to subscription-based services) with US online music revenues of €207 million (of which €155.9m are attributable to downloads and €51.1m to subscription-based services), blaming a 'lack of innovative and dynamic structures for the cross-border collective management of legitimate online music services' (p. 6) as 'a commercial users requires a licence from each and every relevant collective rights manager in each territory of the EU in which the work is accessible' (p. 8). -Users should have the choice of the one stop shopping platform when acquiring the licences for the rights for regional and global operation. 53 However, at closer inspection the prescription is anything but simple. The first implementation decision relates to the nature of competition to be introduced. Will it be price competition (i.e. are users able to negotiate tariffs individually with the societies of their choice), or will there be a collectively set Europe-wide tariff (such as for the mechanical reproduction right which record producers are already able to clear with one collecting society of their choice). 54 In the first scenario, users will seek a licence from the society with whom they can negotiate the cheapest tariff; in the second scenario, users individually cannot change the tariff structure, and competition takes place between societies only for services to right holders. 55 The second implementation decision relates to the distribution rules operated by necessary. 57 This follows the approach in the IFPI [Simulcasting] Decision that 'in new technology fields, territorial restrictions in the management of those rights are generally not acceptable, and must be reviewed'. 58 Price competition, and distribution rule competition are not discussed, either because the implications have not been seen, or perhaps because it is politically convenient to fudge the issue.
Other provisions relate to equitable 59 distribution of royalties (Provisions 10-12), nondiscrimination of representation (Provision 13), accountability (Provision 14) and dispute resolution (Provision 15). These rules are aimed at improving governance (10-15) but similarly evade detail. Accountability and dispute settlement is primarily defined in relation to right-holders, not users -while COM 261 had stated explicitly (at 3.5.2) that under an appeals procedure '[i]t is essential for users to be in a position to contest the tariffs, be it through access to the courts, specially created mediation tribunals or with the assistance of public authorities which supervise the activities of collecting societies'.
The Commission Recommendation appears in line with a transaction cost rationale of collective administration. Authors, publishers, record labels or performers are conceptualised as one category, right-holders, and users are treated purely economically, regardless of whether they are engaged in a desirable cultural activity (say, small live venues), or act as a major multinational player (e.g. commercial radio station, record label, music TV). However, the main transaction cost user benefit, i.e.
to be able to get all rights from one source, is thrown out.
Commissioner McCreevy anticipates that competition between collecting societies will lead to the evolution of 'attractive packages -repertoire', gathered by many different rights management services. 60 The decision to use competition law 57 In COM 261, the Communication had proposed (at para 3.4) to revisit the GEMA I categories of rights, owners may withhold. principles in order to revamp collective administration may succeed in pressing collecting societies into speedier and more accurate business processes, lowering overheads -thus increasing productive efficiency. However, offering a choice to licensors and licensees (who continuously assess the transaction costs of multiple contracting) may support not a universal service system (to which all right holders have access on equitable terms), but a system where the major right holders and users selectively decide, supported by sophisticated information technology, whether administering collectively is worthwhile -and if so, which collecting society to use. 61 Niche repertoire may be abandoned, as it is more expensive to monitor, collect and distribute than broadcasters' play lists. Distribution shares in favour of authors will come under market pressure from publishers.
Depending on these details, competition between collecting societies may have the following consequences (which could be analysed as a move away from a 'solidarity' rationale of collective administration):
• major users will be able to reduce their licensing tariffs as they negotiate with competing collecting societies
• major right holders will inject rights into the society that distributes most to them (or will not inject at all)
• publishers' influence within collecting societies will increase
• collecting societies will have few incentives to offer low start-up tariffs to small, innovative users
• cross-subsidies in the distribution of licence fees between big and small right holders will be phased out Increasing the transparency of collective administration, and requiring cross-border administration and licences (using competition law tools) paradoxically may increase the influence of major users and right holders (in effect reducing competition).
Alternative policy principles
The policy interventions advanced by the European Commission are not explicit about whether competition in the market for rights exploitation services is an aim in itself, or a means to shake up the bureaucracy of collecting societies while preserving non-economic goals. Within the framework of Community competencies, noneconomic aims are hard to articulate. Thus the Commission's preference for the language of competition is understandable. 62 Still, better policy making has to start with a clear statement of regulatory aims.
COM 261 begun with a salutation of non-economic aims: 'Besides the more general economic aims of stimulating investment, growth and job creation, copyright protection serves non-economic objectives, in particular creativity, cultural diversity, cultural identity' (para 1.1.1). However, as discussed in the previous section, the measures proposed are couched in the competition law language of 'nondiscrimination', 'efficiency', 'rationalisation' and 'transparency' (see particularly Recitals 9, 10, 12 and 13).
In this final section I argue that the collective administration of copyright and competition law are two distinct, but partially overlapping mechanisms that ought to foster two aims.
Access
Copyright law awards broad exclusive rights for long periods of time (in Europe, 
Reward
Although the copyright term is derived from the author's life, in commercial practice it is usually assigned to a market intermediary for exploitation. The terms of copyright contracts tend to favour best-selling authors. Diversity of cultural production will benefit from a reward system that is accessible to niche creators and allows for collective bargaining. 64 Despite the noise generated by the lobbying efforts of major right holders and users (often focussing on 'piracy'), a consensus on these two regulatory aims is achievable.
It can be backed up by first principles laid down in instruments such as the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity 65 , and the social and cultural articles of the EC Treaty.
How to articulate access aims?
The aims of a regime of collective administration to provide access is to a considerable extent congruent with competition law aims, as the discussion on the 'refusal to supply' jurisprudence in section two above indicated. However, the hurdle for examining the exploitation of copyright under the Magill test is high. 66 68 The so-called three-step-test is taken from Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention where it defines permitted exceptions to the reproduction right only. Note that under Berne, the three-step-test does only apply to the reproduction right. However, Art. 13 of the TRIPS Agreement (1994) and Art. 10 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (1996) make the test applicable to all copyright limitations and exceptions. 69 According to COM 261, such prescriptions would be at variance with the intellectual property principles on territoriality and possibly with international obligations (WIPO 1996 Treaties, establishing the Internet right as an exclusive right: 'making available to the public… in such a manner that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them'; Art. 8, WIPO Copyright Treaty; Arts. 10 and 14, WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty). Many commentators think that under the Berne three-step-test, collective management can only be compulsory if right holders have no other viable way to exercise an exclusive right. Under a system of extended licensing (used for example in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland), 'as soon as a substantial number of right holders of a certain category agree to participate in a collective scheme, the scheme is automatically extended not only to other national right holders in the same category, but to all foreign ones as well' (Gervais, supra note___, at 29).
How to articulate reward aims?
Facilitating the reward of creators beyond their individual bargaining power in cultural markets relies on a non-economic justification that appears to be at variance with competition law's emphasis on allocative efficiency. But note that EC competition jurisprudence has recognized the social benefits of collective bargaining, exempting some practices from examination under the rules of competition (for discussion of Albany and Brentjens, see section two above).
In developing single market and competition policies, the Commission is also obliged to take account of cultural aspects (Art. 151 EC). Fostering cultural diversity through the encouragement of creators at the margins of commercial viability, creators in smaller domestic markets, and creators in niche cultures is a defensible Community aim that can influence the regulation of copyright management services.
Which Community instruments should be used to regulate collecting societies?
Any intervention can legitimately draw on single market concerns. As COM states (at Criteria for the re-assessment of current licensing tariffs and distributions
Having delivered a governance structure that can meaningfully review tariffs and distributions, the attention needs to turn to the criteria to be used in setting tariffs and distributions. This is a thorny area where the experience of countries with a central copyright board may be helpful. Often proxies are sought, seeking to simulate agreements between willing buyers and sellers. Measures of substitutability suggested for the assessment of tariffs include audience ratings, advertisers' willingness to pay, broadcasters' willingness to pay, viewers' willingness to pay under pay-per-view. 71 It is submitted that tariffs and distributions should be reviewed not merely from proxies of willing individual sellers and buyers (the transaction cost rationale) but also under a framework of socio-cultural aims. For reasons outlined above, this may exceed Community competencies and therefore has a more natural home in the domestic social and cultural policies of Member States. However, this poses a problem for information services (such as digital downloads of music files) that increasingly take place in a single European market. 72 Central licensing agreements between major right holders and users negotiated at pan-European level will have pan-European social and cultural consequences. Which regulator will supervise these?
70 One proposal, still within the remit of competition law, would be to recast collective administration as an 'essential facility' (Temple Lang supra note___, p. 59): 'A single Community society could achieve the same results more efficiently than the present over-complex structure, and might not be significantly less competitive.' 71 The Canadian experience is usefully summarised in Y.A. George Hynna 'Evolution of Judicial Review of Decisions of The Copyright Board'. In SENA (Case C-245/00 [2003] ECR I-1251), the European Court of Justice developed the meaning of the Community concept of 'equitable remuneration' as an assessment 'in the light of the value of that use in trade' (para 37). The method chosen by the Member States must be 'such as to enable a proper balance to be achieved between the interests of performing artists and producers in obtaining remuneration for the broadcast of a particular phonogram, and the interests of third parties in being able to broadcast the phonogram on terms that are reasonable' (para 36). 72 For example, under a deal announced in January 2007, EMI Music Publishing, PRS and GEMA will form a new company CELAS which will be the only source of licences for EMI repertoire for online and mobile usage within 41 European territories (www.celas.eu).
The tension between Community and national perspectives is most acute with respect to three issues. Here, competition law can offer few solutions:
-Collecting societies extract too heavily from fragmented users (such as clubs, concert venues and smaller websites) where the societies' bargaining power is high and collection is expensive. This is inefficient, as well as introducing an undesirable bias against diverse and local cultures. Live performances in small venues and schools should be encouraged: 'contemporary' material should not be significantly more expensive than 'classical' works. Taking account of these cultural imperatives, collection should concentrate on the major commercial users (where the societies' bargaining power and fees are under pressure in a system that may facilitate user choice).
-Licences permitting free use must be possible. The blanket assignment of rights to collecting societies has become a problem for initiatives that wish to offer authors more options in authorising transformative and non-commercial use of copyright works. 73 Administratively this creates a similar challenge for collecting societies as the partial withdrawal of repertoire by major right holders (the 'cherry-picking' problem). A solution that passes the onus of obtaining and proving clearance under non-standard conditions to users should avoid the additional costs which individually tailored licensing conditions would create for collective management bodies. 74 -Distributions should include a socio-cultural element (e.g. cross-subsidy big→small; investor→creator; mainstream→niche; foreign→domestic).
This proposition is at variance with the Commission's proposal to match distributions as closely as possible to actual use (and in particular improve the collecting and distribution for non-domestic right holders).
Regarding re-distribution in favour of smaller right holders, an economic justification may be available: Collecting societies are bodies authors join 73 The best-known initiative is Creative Commons (www.creativecommons.org).
before they know who will be successful. The collective administration of copyright then can be conceptualised as an insurance scheme. 75 With regard to the other proposed re-distributions, cultural arguments need to be mustered: It cannot be in the interest of countries whose consumers have come to rely heavily on (mostly) Anglo-American cultural imports, to perpetuate such a system by collecting and distributing domestic fees largely for the benefits of foreign right holders. Supporting a diverse domestic scene of cultural production is a legitimate aim of copyright policy, and a bias in the collective administration towards domestic creators appears entirely justifiable.
Conclusion
In this article, I have argued that the collective administration of copyrights should be conceived as an independent regulatory regime, ensuring access to and reward for creative materials. In pursuing these aims, policy makers should use the tools of competition law where they are available under current EC jurisprudence. Collecting societies are currently insufficiently accountable to society, and pursue many practices that are at variance with the aims of access and reward. Radical reform of their governance is needed. If collecting societies are to become facilitators of an information society, users will have to be represented in the supervisory structures, and tariffs and distribution rules need to be meaningfully reviewed in a public forum.
While governance rules are usefully regulated at Community level, the review of tariffs and distributions as far as possible must remain under domestic control.
Member states ought to be able to express their diverse social and cultural priorities.
However, where pan-European services make this impracticable (for example in the field of music), tariffs and distributions need to be supervised at pan-European level.
As a first move, a public repository should be created of all collective management agreements with a European dimension, enabling public debate. As a second step, a
European Copyright Board should be established under a constitution of Access and
Reward (borrowing mechanisms from other regulated industries, such as utilities or broadcasting). 76 The Board would be expected to develop jurisprudence on issues such as duty to contract, free use, socio-cultural deduction and so on.
The European Courts, and recent interventions by the Commission have evaded the analytical choice between the rules of competition (applying competition law to an hitherto sheltered sector of economic activity) and a sui generis regulatory regime beyond the rules of competition (taking account of wider socio-cultural aims). This article has outlined the implications for a European information society. 76 There is a tradition of contestable copyright tariffs particularly in the UK, Germany, Canada and the US. However, the remit of these quasi-judicial bodies tends to be narrow, with a standard of review seeking market emulation.
